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ABSTRACT
Anti-forensics, whether intentionally to disrupt investigations or simply an effort to make a computer system run better, is becoming of increasing concern to digital investigators. This work
attempts to assess the problem of anti-forensics techniques commonly deployed in South Korea.
Based on identified challenges, a method of signature-based anti-forensic trace detection is proposed
for triage purposes that will assist investigators in quickly making decisions about the suspect digital devices before conducting a full investigation. Finally, a prototype anti-forensic trace detection
system is given to demonstrate the practicality of the proposed method.
Keywords: Anti-Forensics Detection; Digital Forensic Triage; Trace Signature Detection; Preliminary Digital Forensic Analysis; Advanced Preview; Anti-Anti-Forensics; File System Analysis;
Windows Registry Analysis

1.

INTRODUCTION

With the growing number, type and complexity
of digital devices, the amount of data needing
analyzed for digital evidence is constantly growing (Casey, Ferraro, & Nguyen, 2009; Gogolin,
2010).
With it, there is a growing concern about the use of anti-forensic techniques
that attempt to hinder digital investigations
(Wundram, Freiling, & Moch, 2013). While
there are various motives for anti-forensics
(Harris, 2006; Garfinkel, 2007), generally antiforensic techniques are used to obstruct the acquisition, analysis or validation of digital evidence. For example, there have been a number
of cases where disk encryption either prevented
further investigation, or proved to be a difficult obstacle to acquiring evidence (Casey, Fellows, Geiger, & Stellatos, 2011; Conrad, Dorn,
c 2017 ADFSL

& Craiger, 2010).
Rogers (Rogers, 2005) defined four categories
of anti-forensics; data hiding, artifact wiping,
trail obfuscation and attacks against computer
forensics. When any of these types of antiforensic techniques are used, investigators face
at least two challenges. The first is simply detecting that some form of anti-forensic technique has been used on a system under investigation. The next is the attempted reconstruction of data or information that was affected by
the use of the anti-forensic technique. This work
is primarily concerned with the detection of the
use of an anti-forensic technique in order to give
an investigator more information prior to conducting a full digital forensic investigation. If an
investigator can more effectively check whether
anti-forensic techniques have been used on a
suspect system, such information could potenPage 31
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tially influence the strategies used during a full
investigation.
Providing more information to an investigator before a full investigation is similar to the
objective of triage (Koopmans & James, 2013)
or advanced preview (Shaw & Browne, 2013)
investigation models discussed in prior works.
A number of tools have implemented different
anti-forensic detection mechanisms, usually focusing on one category of anti-forensics, which
can take too long to be suitable for triage purposes, eg. in the case of file entropy testing to
detect encrypted containers. This work instead
attempts to apply anti-forensic detection that
is fast enough to be suitable for digital forensic triage purposes, where triage provides intelligence for decision making about exhibits, not
exhibit exclusion.
This work extends the that of Geiger (Geiger,
2005) who analyzed a number of ‘counterforensic’ tools related to artifact wiping. He
identified a number of “failure areas” where artifact wiping tools failed to completely remove
relevant data. Further, such artifact wiping
tools also were found to lead to information disclosure about that tool’s usage. Based on these
findings, a detection utility was later created
that “searches for signatures of tested counterforensic tools” (Geiger, 2006). This utility uses
Regular Expressions to “match patterns in the
name fields of deleted MFT records and from associated data sectors”. Unfortunately, the signatures that are created and used by the utility
are not specifically defined, and the utility itself does not appear to be available, or may be
available to Law Enforcement only. Other challenges with this approach include a focus only
on artifact wiping tools, where other categories
of anti-forensics are neglected; a focus only on
NTFS file systems; and an apparent manual creation of signatures using AccessData’s Forensic
Tool Kit (FTK).
Similar to the work of Geiger, we apply prior
automated event reconstruction techniques that
utilize signatures based on file system and Windows Registry traces. For example, the work
of Khan, Chatwin et al. (Khan, Chatwin,
& Young, 2007) attempted to learn applicaPage 32

tion ‘footprints’ using Bayesian networks based
on file system meta-data. A non-probabilistic
model was later proposed by James, Gladyshev et al. (James, Gladyshev, & Zhu, 2011)
that used real-time system analysis to create
signatures of user actions based on created observable traces. Similar methods implementing
snapshot-based signature derivation have also
been proposed for automatic event reconstruction purposes (Kang, Lee, & Lee, 2013; Kalber,
Dewald, & Freiling, 2013). Event reconstruction, however, focuses more on the reconstruction of events in time, where this work is concerned only with the detection of traces that
may indicate anti-forensic techniques were used
on a suspect system.

1.1

Contribution

This work contributes to the field of digital
forensic investigation first by assessing the state
of anti-forensics techniques encountered in practice by Law Enforcement in South Korea. Based
on identified practical needs of investigators, a
modified, more robust, real-time signature creation algorithm that allows for the understanding of differences in user actions relating to a
specific program is proposed, followed by a novel
application of the proposed signature-detection
method. Instead of applying signature-based
detection to problems of automatic event reconstruction, this work utilizes fast trace detection
using derived signatures to assist with digital
forensic triage tasks. Finally, this work demonstrates a prototype trace detection system that
allows an investigator to quickly triage suspect
devices based on traces of anti-forensic activities. The prototype uses a signature structure
that can be applied to any file system, and is
released as a free, open-source project for use
by all.

2.

MOTIVATION

While several prior works have examined the
problem of anti-forensics from the perspective of
classification and detection (Rogers, 2005; Harris, 2006; Garfinkel, 2007; Rekhis & Boudriga,
2010; Wundram et al., 2013), informal discussion with investigators in various countries rec 2017 ADFSL
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veal that some forms of anti-forensics, such as
advanced data hiding, are not as often encountered in what they consider ‘normal’ cases. Instead, it appears to be more common for investigators to encounter attempts at artifact wiping.
To identify the state of anti-forensics, and
the challenges it poses to practical digital forensic investigations in South Korea, a survey was
distributed to Korean public and private sector digital forensic investigators. In total, 11
responses were received1 .
Five investigators claimed to have 3 or more
years experience, while six investigators claimed
to have less than 3 years experience. 82% (9 out
of 11) of respondents claimed to have encountered some form of anti-forensics during their
time as a digital forensic investigator. 55% (6
out of 11) of respondents claimed to use some
form of anti-forensic detection tool. 100% (11
out of 11) respondents believe there is a need
for more-advanced anti-forensic detection tools.
Likewise, 100% of investigators listed ease of use
as the main desired criteria for an anti-forensic
detection tool. Investigators primarily claimed
that detection should focus on whether antiforensic tools exist(ed) on the suspect system,
and to what extent they had been used, e.g. installation only, portable, running, uninstalled,
etc.
Based on the survey results, there is a need
for an easy to use anti-forensic detection tool to
help an investigator quickly determine to what
extent anti-forensic techniques may have been
used on a system under investigation.

JDFSL V12N1

may be updated. A signature is the collection
of these updates, where each update constitutes
one ‘trace’.

3.1

Signature Creation

Prior works focus on the detection of specific
trace update patterns derive signatures either
by using snapshot analysis (Kang et al., 2013;
Kalber et al., 2013) comparing the updates to
data sources between to different snapshots of
the same system, or using real-time trace update detection (James et al., 2011).
This work proposes an advancement to the
real-time trace update detection. Using realtime trace update detection, it is possible for
some specific actions to be differentiated, for
example ‘install’ and ‘run’ actions, and corresponded to their specific trace update patterns.
Similar to prior works, trace updates are detected from the file system and Windows Registry, if available.
In this work, signatures of anti-forensics were
created using the following method:
1. Create test system (Virtual Machine)
2. Run file system logger (Process Monitor)
3. Execute desired action
• Install
• Run/Execute
nique

Anti-Forensic

Tech-

• Uninstall
4. Save file system logger output

3. ANTI-FORENSIC
SIGNATURE CREATION
AND DETECTION
A signature is defined as a list of traces created
in a system that are associated with a particular anti-forensic tool or technique. For example,
when running an anti-forensic tool in a Windows system, a number of data sources, such as
file content or meta-data and Registry entries
1

Survey questions and results can be found
at
http://www.cybercrimetech.com/2013/12/bobindicators-of-anti-forensics.html

c 2017 ADFSL

5. Filter log to reduce noise
6. Extract usable unique signature
7. Define traces in resulting signature as regular expressions for portability
This method differs from (James et al., 2011)
in two ways. First, specific actions – such as
install, run and uninstall – are targets for signature creation rather than grouping all actions
into one overall signature. This means that if
unique signatures for each type of action can be
Page 33
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derived then identification in the use of an antiforensic tool may be possible. Next, filtering
is more aggressive. Because reconstruction of
events in time is not necessary, only the traces
that are unique to the action are necessary.
3.1.1

Create Test System

In this work, signature creation was implemented using a virtual machine running a 64bit
version of Windows 7. Process Monitor (procmon) was installed on the system for real-time
file system and Windows Registry update monitoring. A snapshot of the ‘clean’ system was
then created for easy system rollback after testing. Such an environment could potentially be
used to create signatures relating to any operating system.
At this stage, the monitoring program was
used to create a baseline system activity log.
Monitoring was enabled on the system for 5
minutes with no user activities running. The
result is a log of system activities that can be
considered as noise. This log was labeled as
‘falselog.xml’ and will be used to filter results
from application-specific logs.
3.1.2

Figure 2. Action logs for specific anti-forensic
programs combined to filter non-consistently
updated traces per action type

Monitor, execute and save

Once a test system has been created, the action to test must be determined. In this case,
the focus is on anti-forensic programs. Signatures were created for the actions install,
run/execute, and uninstall. If the program was
‘portable’ or does not need to be installed, then
install and uninstall was skipped (Figure 1).
For each selected program, the file system
(and Registry) monitor was started, and each
action relating to the specific program was executed. After each action was executed, the monitor was stopped, the log was exported, and the
log buffer was cleared. Monitoring would be
started again, and the next action in the sequence would be executed.
After all actions in the sequence were executed, and logs were collected, the virtual machine was revered back to the original snapshot.
This process was completed five times per identified application. The resulting logs were a collection of XML files with the name of the anPage 34

Figure 1. The action log collection process executed five times per anti-forensics application

alyzed anti-forensics tool, and the action that
was recorded.
3.1.3

Filter log to reduce noise

The result of the prior step is five logs per
action per anti-forensic program. Since this
work is concerned with reliable traces of antiforensic activities, filtering is used to extract
only commonly-created traces. A filtering program was created to count the number times a
particular trace was updated for a given action
(Figure 2. An excerpt of the results are shown
in table 1. Traces that were not updated at least
once per action log were discarded. Further, any
traces that exist in both the action log, and the
previously-created ‘falselog.xml’ are considered
as background noise, and were removed from
the action log.
Once system and other background ‘noise’
have been removed, the resulting list of traces
are compared to the ‘clean’ test system. Any
c 2017 ADFSL
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Process
Explorer.EXE

Operation
ReadFile

Explorer.EXE
Explorer.EXE

RegOpenKey
RegOpenKey

Explorer.EXE

RegOpenKey

Explorer.EXE

RegOpenKey

Path
Total Hit Log0 Hit file1 Hit
C:\Program
25
5
5
Files\Eraser\Eraser.exe
HKCU\Software\Classes\Applications\Eraser.exe
22
4
4
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows
5
1
1
NT\CurrentVersion\Image
File
Execution
Options\Eraser.exe
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App
5
1
1
Paths\Eraser.exe
HKCR\*\shellex\ContextMenuHandlers\Eraser
5
1
1

Log2 Hit
5

Log3 Hit
5

Log4 Hit
5

4
1

4
1

6
1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Table 1. A selection of filtered traces relating
to the action ‘run’ for the anti-forensic program
‘Eraser’

traces that are detected on the clean test system are considered false positives, and are removed. The resulting list are traces that are
specific to the action conducted with the application. However, they may not be unique
to the action. Each trace may be updated by
either another action relating to the same application, or may potentially overlap with other
currently-unknown applications. In prior works
of event reconstruction, unknown applications
are a problem. However, with digital forensic triage this is a non-issue since any overlap
would, at worst, cause a false positive that an
investigator would need to manually verify during their full investigation.
3.1.4

Extract usable unique signature

Once the list of traces have been filtered for
noise and false positives, traces specific to the
action should be determined. This is done in
two ways. First, for each action relating to a
specific anti-forensic tool, the resulting logs can
be compared. Any traces that exist in both logs
may be removed.
Another option is to execute many actions in
the test system that are not related to the action in question. After the execution of other
non-related actions, if any traces in the signature match, these should also be considered false
positives.
The result of this process should be a short
list of traces that are specific to the action to
be tested. Once this short list is created for all
actions relating to the particular anti-forensics
tool, then the process of installation, execution
and uninstallation should be executed on the
test system, and each resulting signature should
be tested after each action. If traces in a sigc 2017 ADFSL
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Figure 3. Traces of actions detected after each
action was executed, where L1 refers to installation, L2 refers to execution, L3 refers to uninstallation, where circle means a trace of the action was detected and X means no trace of the
action was detected
Action
Install
Run
Uninstall

Trace
C:\Users\user\AppData
\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache
\MetaData
\CE4CFAB51DB3F9AB265C1526D1E6F12F
FC8C5CB969BCDC8ACE4FEF989663C7A4
HKCU\Software\Eraser\Eraser
a02a-33c9ee2d47fe

6\9977d7c4-c940-4b73-

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft
\CryptnetUrlCache\Content
\CE4CFAB51DB3F9AB265C1526D1E6F12F
FC8C5CB969BCDC8ACE4FEF989663C7A4

Table 2. A selection of unique traces for each
identified action relating to the anti-forensic
program ‘Eraser’

nature match before their associated action has
occurred, these traces should be removed.
One example of signature testing is shown in
figure 3. Here it is shown that before any actions
associated with the anti-forensic tool are executed, none of the resulting signatures match.
After installation, only the installation signature (L1) matches; after the anti-forensic tool is
executed both the installation (L1) and execution (L2) signatures match. After uninstall, all
three action signatures match, and this match
is persistent after reboot.
Using this method, the traces specific all actions that are persistent even after a reboot
can be identified. A selection of unique traces
for each action associated with the anti-forensic
program ‘Eraser’ is given in table 2.
3.1.5 Define traces in resulting
signature as regular expressions
for portability
As discussed in prior work (James et al., 2011;
Kang et al., 2013) some form of generalization
of traces within signatures needs to take place to
Page 35
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allow for detection on other systems. This work
uses regular expressions to generalize variables
in signatures. Implementation, as shown, uses
the path and file name, or Registry key. Regular expressions are used for fields that are likely
to change depending on system settings, while
keeping the path name as specific as possible
to ensure only the identified trace is returned
by the regular expression. This will enable the
same signatures to be used on similar systems,
however, it should be noted that signatures are
likely to be different depending on the operating system, and perhaps even the version of the
anti-forensic program.

4.

Figure 4. Design of the Indicators of AntiForensics prototype signature-matching program

SIGNATURE MATCHING

To illustrate the practicality of trace detection
using pre-defined action signatures for digital
forensic triage purposes, a prototype signature
matching tool was created. The program detects what are defined as ‘Indicators of AntiForensics’ (IOAF) to help a digital investigator
make decisions about suspect systems in regards
to anti-forensic activity. The IOAF tool is available under a free, open source license2 .
The IOAF detection prototype currently accepts a forensic disk image as an input, along
with a set of signatures (Regular Expressions)
to be detected (Figure 4). The MFT parsing
module uses ‘fls’ in the Sleuth Kit to parse the
input disk image, and outputs the file system information to a SQLite database. The Sleuthkit
(icat) is also used to extract Registry hives from
an input disk image. Keys and their associated values are also saved to a separate SQLite
database. Signatures are stored as regular expressions in a separate signature database.
After parsing the file system and Registry (if
available) with the Sleuth Kit, the signature
parsing and matching module compares traces
in the signature database with traces stored in
the file system and Registry databases. The success or failure of a defined trace matching one
(or more - in the case of deleted files) is output
to a report file. A successful match (traces of
2

The
source
for
IOAF
is
available
https://github.com/CheonChangGeun/IOAF

Page 36
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Figure 5. The Indicators of Anti-Forensics prototype resulting report when no traces defined
in the signature database are found in the suspect system

anti-forensic activities) is shown in green, while
a non-matching pattern is shown in red (no indication of anti-forensics). Example output reports for the anti-forensic tool ‘Eraser’, and the
actions ‘install’ and ’run’ are shown in figures
5 6 7. Figure 5 shows derived signatures tested
against a system where the actions relating to
the anti-forensic tool have not been run. In this
case, no indicators of anti-forensics are found.
Figure 6 shows the same signature tested after
the action ‘install’ has been run on the suspect
system. In this case only the install action has
associated indicators that are detected. Finally,
figure 7 shows the same signature tested after
running both the install and execute actions,
where both actions resulted in detectable indicators.

4.1

Weaknesses

There are a number of weaknesses with the
proposed method. One that is common to all
c 2017 ADFSL
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posed method for creating signatures. The current method examines what files are affected by
anti-forensic actions, but is not suitable for determining exactly what changes were made to
the contents of the files, except in the case of
the Windows Registry.
Figure 6. The Indicators of Anti-Forensics prototype resulting report when one action defined
in the signature database is found in the suspect
system (green), and indicators of other actions
are not found (red)

Figure 7. The Indicators of Anti-Forensics prototype resulting report when all traces defined
in the signature database are found in the suspect system

signature-based detection methods is that if a
signature does not exist for each specific antiforensic technique, then the technique cannot
be detected. Some prior knowledge about the
anti-forensic technique is required to be able to
derive a related signature. Once a signature is
derived, however, it is can be easily shared between investigators. More global collaboration
between investigators – to create and share signatures of found anti-forensic techniques – could
potentially reduce this weakness.
Similarly, as anti-forensic techniques or specific tools are developed over time, the resulting
associated traces will also change. While there
normally appears to be a core group of relatively
generic traces (James et al., 2011), signatures
for anti-forensic techniques and programs will
need to be maintained over time.
The proposed method, in an attempt to be a
fast triage tool, currently only utilizes file metadata and the current Windows Registry. More
data sources, such as Windows Restore Points
and log files, should be included in the analysis. This is partially a weakness with the proc 2017 ADFSL

5.

CONCLUSIONS

Digital investigators, at least within South Korea, are encountering the use of anti-forensic
tools and techniques. Although it is difficult
to determine the extent of the problem, investigators do see a need for better detection when
such techniques are used on systems under investigation. This work has proposed a method
for generally identifying whether anti-forensic
tools exist, and – in some cases – to what extent
those tools have been used. By focusing on antiforensic trace detection rather than full event
reconstruction, such a method can be implemented as a type of digital investigation triage
tool that quickly gives an investigator more information about suspect systems that have yet
to receive a full analysis. This can help investigators prioritize devices, as well as ensuring
investigators are better informed about the potential state of a suspect device.
This work has demonstrated the ‘Indicators
of Anti-Forensics’ detection tool. The results
of the tool are dependent on the quality of the
signatures that are created, whether unique signatures for each ‘action’ exist, and whether a
signature for an anti-forensic tool or technique
can be created at all. Some techniques, for example, may leave no discernible traces on a system. While the absence of information could be
an indicator of anti-forensic activities, if changes
to the system are consistent with the normal
running of the system, then a signature of the
action can be difficult or impossible to create.
Similarly, overly general trace definitions may
result in multiple traces being detected that are
false positives. While false positives are preferred over false negatives in digital investigations, ensuring the quality of signatures can help
to reduce these challenges.
Future work will first look at improving the
Page 37
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user experience of the IOAF detection tool for
faster trace detection and better processing and
reporting within a digital forensic triage workflow. Aside from technical aspects, future work
will include a better understanding of the needs
of Law Enforcement outside of South Korea in
terms of anti-forensics detection.
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